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Big data busts crypto: 'Sweet32' captures collisions in old ciphers
Boffins blow up Blowfish and double down on triple DES
Researchers with France's INRIA are warning that 64-bit ciphers – which endure in TLS configurations and OpenVPN – need to go for the walk behind the shed.
The research institute's Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaëtan Leurent have demonstrated that a man-in-the-middle on a long-lived encrypted session can gather enough data for a “birthday attack” on Blowfish and triple DES encryption. They dubbed the attack “Sweet32”.
Sophos' Paul Ducklin has a handy explanation of why it matters here.
The trick to Sweet32, the Duck writes, is the attackers worked out that with a big enough traffic sample, any repeated crypto block gives them a start towards breaking the encryption – and collisions are manageably common with a 64-bit block cipher like Blowfish or Triple-DES.
They call it a “birthday attack” because it works on a similar principle to what's known as the “birthday paradox” – the counter-intuitive statistic that with 23 random people in a room, there's a 50 per cent chance that two of them will share a birthday.
In the case of Sweet32 (the 32 being 50 per cent of the 64 bits in a cipher), the “magic number” is pretty big: the authors write that 785 GB of captured traffic will, under the right conditions, yield up the encrypted HTTP cookie and let them decrypt Blowfish- or Triple-DES-encrypted traffic.
If you do it right, and here begins the TL;dr part.
To launch the attack, you need to:
- Get a victim to visit a malicious site (site A) – one that they have to log into. The victim's login sets an HTTP cookie the browser uses for future requests;
- Keep the connection alive long enough to store 785 GB of encrypted data blocks, and look for a collision;
- Decrypt the login cookie.
Decryption is still the hard part: the researchers note that it's far from an instant process:
On Firefox Developer Edition 47.0a2, with a few dozen workers running in parallel, we can send up to 2,000 requests per second in a single TLS connection. In our experiment, we were lucky to detect the first collision after only 25 minutes (220.1 requests), and we verified that the collision revealed [the plaintext we were after …The full attack should require 236.6 blocks (785 GB) to recover a two-block cookie, which should take 38 hours in our setting. Experimentally, we have recovered a two-block cookie from an HTTPS trace of only 610 GB, captured in 30.5 hours.
As they note, however, long-lived encrypted connections exist in at least one real-world setting: VPN sessions.
“Our attacks impact a majority of OpenVPN connections and an estimated 0.6% of HTTPS connections to popular websites. We expect that our attacks also impact a number of SSH and IPsec connections, but we do not have concrete measurements for these protocols” (emphasis added).
For users, that means switching from 64-bit ciphers to 128-bit ciphers; or if you can't get the server to switch, set up your client to force frequent re-keying.
Browser makers, TLS library authors and OpenVPN have been notified and are working on patches. ®