This article is more than 1 year old
Tick-tock, tick-tock. Oh, that's just the sound of compromised logins waiting to ruin your day
Nothing is secure, everything is hackable. Wisdom
Comment It has never been easier to conduct a cyber attack. There now exists a range of off-the-shelf tools and services that do all the heavy lifting – you just need to pick an approach and tool you like best.
There's ransomware-as-a-service with its "here's one I made earlier" code, search engines that show connected interfaces with known vulnerabilities, and downloadable and easy-to-use scanning tools for the discerning script kiddie.
Heck, why bother with tools that need time and effort to find vulnerable systems? Why not just steal credentials and log in via the front door?
Using Troy Hunt's site Have I Been Pwned?, you can check your user ID against almost 5.4 billion sets of credentials that have been stolen over the last few years. 5.4 billion. One would hope that the majority don't work any more due to breached sites shutting down, people deleting their logins for those sites, and many more changing their passwords. But of 5.4 billion sets of credentials, plenty will still be valid.
Alongside Hunt's project is the flood of credentials that continue to be stolen. One security vendor reckoned eight million per day in 2016. Even with a pinch of "they would say that, wouldn't they" salt, that's rather a lot.
Why does it take so long to detect threats?
You can't detect something you don't see. Imagine, for example, that one of your staff falls for a phishing campaign. How would you know?
With good training, many of them will tell you. They'll realise they gave away their credentials and will call the security or IT team, who will help them change their passwords to avoid compromise. Unless, of course, dishing up the credentials kicked off an automated attack and the exploit has happened already.
Could the threat have been detected? These days, yes, as phishing is a by-numbers game that employs suspicious domains which are easy to spot. That said, there will still be instances where phishing emails do succeed and you're left on clean-up duty.
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But the industry is turning its attention to "behaviour". In this context AI-based monitoring tools are discussed – systems that watch the network, the user PCs and servers to see what people and applications are doing, and looking out for abnormal behaviour.
Now, it is possible to identify abnormal behaviour without such tools. It's straightforward to log the sources of your cloud service logins and run scripts that will smell a virtual rat. In many cases this is an out-of-the-box service that's turned on by default. Yes, AI tools are much cooler and more effective, but you can do the basics with free features and simple scripts.
This approach can and does fail, however, when – as often happens – people either don't turn on logging or they do turn it on but don't monitor the results.
So all kinds of systems are open to attack because the unifying factors in each are the means of authentication, the password, and the presence of humans.
Let's say the user gave away their password, it wasn't detected but you were lucky: it simply got squirrelled away in a database rather than deployed in an automatic attack. The user has changed the password.
What have they changed their password to? Something completely different, I hope. In many cases, the previous password isn't a million miles away from the old: if they had R3alC0mplexP4ssword43, the new one is likely to be R3alC0mplexP4ssword44.
You'll have configured the system not to let them use something too short, or something that's not complex, or something they've used before: checking to see if they've used something sufficiently different from their old ones is harder.
And that's because systems are secure. They don't store passwords in plain text – they hash them first. Which means it's non-trivial to check new passwords for similarities with old ones. All you can do is take a set of variations of the new one, hash them, and compare them with the database – which is far from exhaustive, and attackers will always be able to try more alternatives at their leisure than your system can in the few seconds you have in a password change function.
The point is that compromised credentials have longevity. Even if you changed them instantly, they could be used months or years later with some cunning heuristic algorithm to help guess the passwords that succeeded them. A ticking time bomb, as it were, except you can't hear the ticking.
Are we configuring systems correctly?
Have a cloud-based email system without multi-factor authentication? You and thousands of others, yet there's no way you can configure a single-factor authentication mechanism securely. Make passwords as complex as you like, force changes as often as you like, but someone will eventually give up their credentials and the hackers are in.
Do we know how to configure our systems properly anyway? Not so long ago I port-scanned a client's LAN and found a SAN controller. Google told me the default "admin" and "root" passwords. The "admin" password didn't work (they'd clearly changed it) but the "root" one let me straight in. Why? The client didn't know the "root" login existed. True, I had to be in their office to get on their LAN, but that's not always the case. And they had MAC address whitelisting, but I just configured my Mac's LAN card to pretend to be the meeting room PC.
How bad is this situation? Search engines such as Shodan.io will serve up screen after screen of vulnerable systems with default credentials set. So it's pretty bad.
Are systems more susceptible than others?
Top of the list: anything in the cloud, especially email. By default the average cloud-based mail application is more accessible than something hidden in a corporate LAN behind a NAT firewall.
Next is anything web-facing by necessity: if you have to make it open to the world, the world can probe it for insecurities. The majority of attacks you can do in this context are by probing software vulnerabilities not using compromised credentials, but there are so many it has to be stated.
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Then anything "old". This source of attack might not come from compromised credentials but, again, vulnerabilities as systems go unpatched through oversight or by falling off their vendor's support roadmap by dint of their age.
Finally, anything on a network. Even if something isn't directly vulnerable, it may be possible to reach it via something else in your infrastructure and then hop off over the LAN using trust relationships or – yes – compromised credentials from internal application or database logins.
What can we do?
First we can make our passwords as complex as we can, and change them regularly. That's a pain for users, but we find compromises that work. Most importantly we need to stop thinking that user IDs and passwords are enough. Multi-factor authentication is absolutely mandatory for anything that can be accessed from the internet, and since our people are getting so used to it – and because it's so simple to put tools such as face recognition or fingerprint scanners on our devices – why not use it internally too?
Next, provide rigorous, regular training to help our users stop falling for scams. I've done face-to-face awareness training programmes whose outcome has demonstrably been to double user reports of suspicious activity and halve the number of accidental breaches.
Finally, stop making stupid mistakes. If your connected device has any default credentials, or has any services running that you don't need, you need a kicking. And a good slap if you're not updating the software and firmware, but that's a separate issue. We need to train our techies properly: if they don't know how to secure it, they can't secure it properly.
If we can't prevent passwords being stolen and systems compromised, we have two options. One is to search for ways to prevent passwords from becoming such a weak link.
The best way to do this, ironically, is to share information about our security with others in the same situation. Remember I talked about tools that flag activity that isn't "normal"? The best way to teach AI what "normal" constitutes would be to pour data into the right machine models. In this case, the sources for this data should be companies and organisations like us. Not only would our contribution help others, but their contributions would help to alert us when someone tries to re-use or abuse our users' credentials.
The other option is for greater monitoring, using things like rules to spot signs of a breach – such as a user's access from new and exotic locations, for example – with the addition of automatic alerts. Also, for more intelligence that can learn to differentiate more subtle and hidden forms of rogue behaviour.
Monitoring means you don't just find the bad guys but also identify whose IDs have been nicked.
Compromised credentials are an existential risk that manifests itself as a practical threat. We can protect ourselves because the tools are getting better – we just need to recognise that that ticking sound inside our IT systems is a wake-up call. ®